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Abstract: Many goods and services are subject to random changes in quality during the 
time between sale and delivery, resulting in markets characterized by lemons-market 
equilibria. We examine two forms of costly verification, ex post inspection and ex ante 
certification.  In equilibrium, ex post verification is used to verify buyers’ reports of low 
quality, while ex ante certification is used to verify sellers’ shipments of high quality.   
Ex post inspection allows buyers to earn rents; in some circumstances, ex ante 
certification allows sellers to earn rents. One would expect buyers to prefer ex post 
inspection while sellers prefer ex ante certification.   3
Verification in Contracts with Random Changes in Quality 
 
Many goods and services are subject to random changes in quality during the time 
between sale and delivery.  Agricultural commodities are a prime example.  Despite 
efforts to control quality during production (for example, by controlling the varieties 
grown, in-season production decisions like pesticide application, and timing of harvest), 
problems in ensuring quality may persist because most agricultural products are 
perishable, making it possible for on-farm quality to differ from delivered quality.  For 
example, fruit may contain mold spores that are unobservable at the time of shipping, but 
blossom into mold during shipment.  Grains may absorb moisture and insect eggs may 
hatch during shipment, reducing quality prior to delivery. 
When quality deteriorates stochastically in this manner, there will likely be 
disputes between sellers and buyers over quality that cannot be resolved without 
independent verification.  In other words, it will not generally be possible to write self-
enforcing contracts because even when quality is completely observable by either party, 
each agent’s observation of quality is insufficient to determine whether its partner in the 
contract has complied with agreed-on contract terms.  When uncontrollable stochastic 
factors account for a significant share of quality deterioration, such problems will persist 
even in repeated transactions.  Without third-party verification, markets in such cases will 
be characterized by lemons-market equilibria where trade in low quality commodities 
prevails. 
Third party verification may make contract enforcement feasible in such cases.  
The bulk of the literature has considered ex ante verification (that is, certification by 
sellers) in cases where quality does not deteriorate.  Costly, perfect certification of quality   4
can suffice to replicate first best market equilibria (Viscusi).   Costly, imperfect 
certification, however, only partially overcomes adverse selection problems (De and 
Nabar); it does so to a greater extent when the cost of verification is higher (Mason and 
Sterbenz).  Third party ex post verification of quality has not been explicitly addressed in 
the literature.  Related literature, however, considers third party verification in a variety 
of settings.  Auditing, one form of third party verification, may induce conformity with 
regulations, for example, taxpayer compliance (Reinganum and Wilde) or truthful cost 
reporting by a monopoly (Baron and Besanko).  Costly, perfect verification can explain 
why s insurance contracts might not completely share risk (Townsend).  If there is no 
commitment to costly verification, contracts designed by a better informed agent have a 
lower verification cost than do contracts designed by an agent with less information 
(Choe). 
This paper considers the role of third-party verification in competitive markets 
when quality changes stochastically in this manner.  We consider allocations of a 
commodity with exogenously determined quality between a high value market subject to 
exogenous deterioration and an alternative market in which quality does not change.  
Without independent verification, lemons market equilibria will predominate.  We 
compare two forms of verification: ex ante certification and ex post verification.  We 
show that ex post verification rectifies the lemons market problem to some extent, but 
allows high value market buyers to earn rent.  Ex ante certification also rectifies the 
lemons market problem but allows some high value market sellers to earn rent.  Thus, 
buyers prefer ex post verification while sellers prefer ex ante certification. 
   5
I. Structure of Consignment and FOB Contracts 
Consider a set of one-time transactions between perfectly competitive, risk-
neutral sellers and buyers.  Each seller possesses one unit of a commodity of quality q, 
which is perfectly observable.  In the absence of (costly) independent verification, q is 
private information.  The distribution of quality across sellers G(q) and its associated 
density g(q) are common knowledge.  The minimum quality is qand maximum quality is 
q.  Each seller has a reservation price l(q), which equals the value of a commodity of 
quality q in an alternative market.  This reservation price is increasing in quality, l¢(q) > 
0.  The quality of the commodity in this alternative use is not subject to random 
deterioration.  It is common knowledge and exogenously given.   
The value of the commodity in the high value market, p(r), depends on its quality 
at the time of receipt, r.  The relationship between received quality and value to the 
buyer, p(r), is common knowledge.  Received quality r is perfectly observable to the 
buyer.  In the absence of (costly) verification it is the buyer’s private information.  The 
value of the commodity is increasing in quality, p¢(r) > 0.  During delivery from the seller 
to the buyer, the commodity undergoes exogenous stochastic deterioration (and so moral 
hazard is not a factor).  The probability that the quality of the commodity at the time of 
delivery is no greater than r, conditional on quality at the time of shipment q, H(r;q), and 
its associated density h(r;q) are common knowledge.  We assume that quality cannot 
deteriorate to less than the minimum q and that quality does not appreciate during 
shipment.  The upper support of H(r;q) is shipped quality q.  We assume that increases in 
q induce the equivalent of first order stochastic dominant shifts in the distribution 
function H(r;q).  In what follows, we concentrate on the case of economic interest, that in   6
which the expected value of the commodity in the high value market, Ep(q) = 
￿
q
q dz q z h z p ) ; ( ) ( , exceeds the reservation price l(q) for at least some  ] , [ q q q˛ .  To 
simplify the analysis of market equilibria, we make the further assumption that 
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, i.e., an increase in quality increases the expected high value 
market price more than the alternative market price. 
We consider two forms of contract: a consignment contract in which the price 
paid to the seller by high value market buyers depends on received quality r and an FOB 
contract in which the price paid to the seller by high value market buyers depends on 
shipped quality q.  In the consignment contract, the high value market buyer reports 
delivered quality (r is delivered quality, and r ˆ is the report of delivered quality) to the 
seller, who then decides whether to accept the buyer’s report or whether to obtain a 
neutral third-party verification of quality.   In the FOB contract, the seller decides 
whether to certify quality q prior to shipping the product to the high value market buyer. 
 
II. First-Best and No-Verification Equilibria in a Competitive Industry 
The basic structure of the transaction is as follows.  First, the seller observes the 
quality of the commodity, q, and decides whether to ship the commodity to the high value 
market or to sell it in the alternative market.  If the seller ships the commodity to the high 
value market, the commodity undergoes stochastic deterioration in quality.  The high 
value market buyer receives the commodity and observes received quality r and thus 
knows its value p(r).  The price the buyer pays to the seller may be based on either the 
seller’s reported shipped quality q (the FOB contract) or on the buyer’s reported received   7
quality r (the consignment contract).  The price paid to sellers under FOB contracts is 
w(q), and the price paid to sellers under consignment contracts is w(r).  Perfect 
competition among buyers leads to equilibrium prices paid to sellers equal to the value of 
the commodity, so that w(q) = Ep(q) under the FOB contract and w(r) = p(r) under the 
consignment contract. 
Our analysis focuses on two different cases.  In the first case, it is optimal for the 
high quality commodities to be sold in the high value market, i.e., Ep(q) > l(q) for some q 
> q*, and the low quality commodities to be sold in the alternative market.  In the second 
case, it is optimal for all commodities, regardless of quality, to be sold in the high value 
market.  The assumptions needed for the first case, expressed as Assumption 1a below, 
are that the expected high value market price for a commodity of minimum quality is less 
than the price for minimum quality in the alternative market while the expected high 
value market price for a commodity of maximal quality is greater than the price for 
minimum quality in the alternative market.  Coupled with the assumption that ¶Ep(q)/¶q 
> l¢(q), this assumption ensures that there exists a q* such that Ep(q) > (=) (<) l(q) for q > 
(=) (<) q*. 
Assumption 1a:  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( q l q Ep and q l q p > < . 
For the second case, we assume that expected prices for each possible level of 
shipped quality are greater than prices in the alternative market. 
Assumption 1b:  ] , [ ), ( ) ( q q q q l q Ep ˛ " > . 
The first best allocation maximizes social welfare, which equals the total value of 
the commodity.  Let  ) q ( d  denote the share of the commodity of quality q sold to a buyer   8
in the high-value market, while the remainder, 1 -  ) q ( d , is sold on the alternative 
market.  The first best allocation is found by choosing d(q) to 
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Under Assumption 1a, high quality commodities will be sold in the high value market 
(see Figure 1) and low quality commodities will be sold in the alternative market.  The 
cut-off quality level, q* in Figure 1a, is determined by the contract’s expected prices 
relative to prices in the alternative market.   In other words, it is optimal to allocate high 
quality commodities to the high value market and low quality commodities to the low 
value market.  Under Assumption 1b, all commodities will be sold in the high value 
market and none will be sold in the alternative market.  In other words, it is optimal to 
allocate all units to the high-value market and none to the low-value market (Figure 2). 
In the absence of independent verification, there will be a lemons market 
equilibrium in which all commodities shipped receive the same price regardless of 
shipped quality.  An FOB contract will be subject to the Lake Wobegon effect: All sellers 
will report that their commodity is the highest possible quality q, so that their reports 
reveal no information to the buyer.  In response, buyers will offer a single price 
regardless of reported quality.  It will be useful to define 
Ep
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the expected high value market price of all commodities no greater than q.  Competition 
among buyers should generate an offered price equal to Ep
u(q ~), where q ~ is the 
maximum quality sold in the high value market. 
There are three possible equilibria.  If Ep
u(q) > l(q), then all commodities will be 
sold in the high value market at a price Ep
u(q).  If Ep
u(q) < l(q), Assumptions 1a and 
1b generate different equilibria.  Under Assumption 1a, l(q) > Ep
u(q) " q, so that all 
commodities will be sold in the alternative market (see Figure 1).  Under Assumption 1b, 
there will exist a q ~ such that all commodities of quality q £ q < q ~ will be sold in the 
high value market while the remainder (q ~ £ q £ q) will be sold in the alternative market 
(see Figure 2).  Note that this last equilibrium features a perverse allocation of quality:  
The highest quality commodities are sold in the low value alternative market while the 
high value market receives only low quality items, if anything. 
Under a consignment contract, buyers have no incentive to report received quality 
truthfully. This is the case because actual delivered quality is not observable to seller and 
because buyers pay a lower price for lower quality.   Thus, under a consignment contract 
every high value market buyer will offer to pay every seller the value of a minimum 
quality commodity, p(q), regardless of shipped quality.  Under Assumption 1a, nothing 
will be sold in the high-value market, since l(q) > p(q) (see Figure 1).  Under 
Assumption 1b, such an offer will elicit the sale of commodities with quality less than  q
~ ~ 
while commodities with quality greater than  q
~ ~ will be sent to the alternative market (see 
Figure 2).  Note that high value market buyers will earn positive rent in this case because 
they pay less than the full value of commodities shipped.  For this reason, there is an   10 
incentive for buyers to deviate from this offer.  One buyer could increase sales volume 
and thus total profit by offering a single price slightly higher than p(q).  Competition of 
this sort among buyers would lead to an equilibrium identical to one of the FOB 
equilibria discussed previously. 
 
III.  Equilibrium Under Consignment Contracts with Verification of Delivered 
Quality 
 
Next, consider the case where the commodity is sold under consignment in the high-
value market and costly verification is available.  The sequence of events in this case is as 
follows.  First, the seller decides whether to ship the commodity to the high value market 
or sell for the reservation price in the alternative market.  If the seller chooses to ship the 
commodity to the high value market, she receives a report of delivered quality from the 
buyer.  The seller either accepts the report and receives the associated high value market 
price or orders a costly inspection that reveals true received quality. 
We derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the contract with inspection, which 
consists of a set of prices and allocation of quality between the high value and the 
alternative markets.   
III.A.  The Seller’s Inspection and Shipping Decisions 
Consider first the seller’s inspection decision on receipt of reported received 
quality.  The seller makes this decision by comparing expected profit with inspection and 
profit from accepting the buyer’s report of delivered quality, r ˆ .  The fact that received 
quality is observed without error implies that verification is perfect, that is, that   11 
inspection reveals the true quality.  Let m(r; r ˆ,q) be the seller’s posterior distribution 
over received quality given the buyer’s report r ˆ and shipped quality q.  Let R be the set 
of possible levels of received quality r that correspond to each report of quality r ˆ.  Then 
m(r;r ˆ,q) = 
￿
R




.  Let c be the cost of an inspection.  We assume that the cost of 
inspection is not prohibitive, specifically, that c < Ep(q) – l(q). 
If the seller ships quality q, the expected net return with inspection equals 
c dz q r z m z p
R
- ￿ ) , ˆ ; ( ) ( .  The return without inspection is  ) r ˆ ( p .  The seller maximizes 
expected profit by choosing the share to be inspected y(q) to 
) ˆ ( )) ( 1 ( ) ˆ ; ( ) ( ) ( max r p q c dz r z m z p q
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It will be optimal to order an inspection when the expected return from inspection 
exceeds the price associated with the reported received quality, 
) ˆ ( ) , ˆ ; ( ) ( r p c dz q r z m z p
R
> - ￿ . 
Next consider the seller’s decision as to whether to sell in the high value market 
or the low value alternative market.  Because deterioration is exogenously stochastic, the 
seller does not know received quality with certainty.  However, the seller does know the 
buyer’s decision rule for reporting quality and can infer from it the probability that the 
buyer will report received quality r ˆ conditional on shipped quality q.  Denote this 
probability v(r ˆ;q).    Then the seller’s decision problem involves choosing the share of   12 
the commodity z(q) to ship to the high value market in order to maximize expected profit 
given the anticipated optimizing choice of whether to order an inspection y*(q): 
) ( )) ( 1 ( ˆ ) ; ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )] ( * 1 [ ) ) ˆ ; ( ) ( ( ) ( * ) ( q l q r d q r v r p q dz c r z m z p q q
q
q R
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  The seller will choose to ship to the high value market if the expected return from 
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v r d q r v r p q dz c r z m z p q q Ew ˆ ) ; ˆ ( ) ˆ ( )] ( * 1 [ ) ) ˆ ; ( ) ( ( ) ( * ) ( y y , 
exceeds the alternative market price l(q). 
 
III.B.  The High Value Market Buyer’s Report of Quality 
  Next consider the high value market buyer’s decision as to the report of received 
quality.  The buyer observes received quality r with certainty but does not know shipped 
quality.  She chooses the report of quality to maximize her profit.  In doing so, she faces a 
tradeoff.  Reporting received quality below the actual level allows her to earn rent by 
paying less than the full value of the commodity.  Reductions in reported received quality 
increase that rent.  At the same time, reducing reported received quality increases the 
likelihood that the seller will order an inspection, in which case the buyer earns no rent.  
The buyer’s optimal report maximizes the expected rent. 
  Formally, the buyer can form a posterior distribution of shipped quality 
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Let U(r ˆ) be the set of shipped qualities q such that a given report of received quality r ˆ 
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.  Then the 
buyer’s posterior probability that a given report of received quality will not induce the 
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and the buyer’s expected rent is  
)] ; ˆ ( 1 )[( ( ) ; ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ( r r K r p r r K r p r p - - -  
  The first order condition for a maximum can be written 
[ ] 0 ) ˆ (
) ; ˆ (
) ; ˆ (
) ˆ ( ) ( = ¢ - - r p
r r K
r r k
r p r p . 
Since p¢(r)  > 0 and  ) ; ˆ ( / ) ; ˆ ( r r K r r k  > 0, it follows that p(r) – p(r ˆ) > 0 and thus that r > 
r ˆ .  
Proposition 1: With ex post verification the high value market buyer always underreports 
quality and, on the average, earns positive rent. 
 
One implication of Proposition 1 is that the seller’s ex ante expected return from a 
high value market sale, Ew
v(q), will be less than the first best expected return Ep(q) (for 
qualities greater than the minimum q) because the first best does not involve an 
inspection cost and because, under the consignment contract, the buyer always 
underreports quality.  As a result, the equilibrium allocation of commodities under the 
consignment contract will generally differ from the first best.   14 
Proposition 1 also allows us to define R, the set of received qualities consistent 
with the buyer’s report of r ˆ, more precisely in terms of the optimal report of received 
quality for a high value market buyer, i.e., 
{ } )]} ; ˆ ( 1 )[( ( ) ; ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ( max{ arg ˆ : r r K r p r r K r p r p r r R - - - ˛ = . 
 
III.C.  Separating Equilibrium 
The nature of the equilibrium allocation of commodities depends on the information 
conveyed by the report of received quality r ˆ.  Suppose first that the solution to the 
buyer’s optimization problem is unique, i.e., that there is a unique optimal report of 
received quality r ˆ for each given received quality r.  In this case, the seller will be able to 
deduce received quality r exactly from reported quality r ˆ.  The seller’s posterior 
distribution of received quality r will be degenerate: m(z; r ˆ,q) = 1 for z equal to true 
received quality r and 0 otherwise.  The seller will thus order an inspection whenever 
reported received quality r ˆ falls below a critical level  * ˆ r  defined by 
0 *) ˆ ( ) ( = - - r p c r p . 
The buyer’s subjective assessment of the probability that the seller will order an 
inspection is similarly degenerate: K(r ˆ;r) = 1 whenever r ˆ is below  * ˆ r  and 0 otherwise.  
The buyer will therefore report  * ˆ r , avoid an inspection, and earn a rent equal to the cost 
of inspection c.  As a result, the expected return to selling in the high value market will 
equal the true expected high value market price given shipped quality q, ￿
q
q
dz q z h z p ) ; ( ) ( , 
less the cost of inspection c.  There will be a critical level of shipped quality q
v defined   15 




v q l c dz q z h z p
v
.  All commodities of quality exceeding q
v will be sold 
in the high value market while the remainder is sold in the alternative market. 
  Under Assumption 1a (see Figure 3), this critical quality q
v will generally exist 
and exceed q*, the critical quality level defining the first-best allocation of quality.  In 
this case ex post verification will replicate the first-best allocation of quality for the 
highest and lowest qualities but not for some intermediate qualities q* < q < q
v.  Under 
Assumption 1b (see Figure 4), two possibilities arise.  If the cost of inspection c is 
sufficiently small (that is, less than p(q) – l(q)), then the equilibrium allocation under 
the consignment contract will be the same as the first best allocation.  If the cost of 
inspection is sufficiently large, specifically, c > p(q) – l(q), however, there will exist a 
critical quality q
v as in the case of Assumption 1a. 
These results can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 2:  With ex post verification, if the buyer’s optimal report of quality and 
received quality is one-to-one function of received quality, then the buyer 
will report quality  * ˆ r (r) defined by p(r ) - c- p( * ˆ r ) = 0.  Sellers will 
never inspect.  The equilibrium allocation of the highest quality 
commodities will equal that under the first best.  Under Assumption 1a, 
the equilibrium allocation of the lowest quality will also equal the first 
best, while some intermediate quality commodities will remain 
misallocated.  The degree of misallocation will depend on both the signal 
of reported quality and the cost of verification. Under Assumption 1b, the 
lowest quality commodities will be misallocated if the cost of inspection c 
> p(q) – l(q ) or Ep(q)-Ew
pv(q) > p(q) – l(q); otherwise, the 
equilibrium allocation will equal the first best for all commodities. 
 
Note that in this case the possibility of verification suffices to make contracts enforceable 
and thus to rectify misallocation of quality, at least in part.  Even though no inspections 
will occur in equilibrium, the threat of inspection induces buyers to report the equivalent   16 
of true received quality.  Interestingly, commercial provision of inspections will not be 
economically viable in such circumstances and government subsidies may be needed to 
make them available.  In other words, contract enforcement measures for addressing 
lemons market problems will be feasible in such cases only through government 
intervention. 
 
III.D.  Pooling Equilibrium 
Next, suppose that the solution to the buyer’s optimization problem is not unique, i.e., 
that there are multiple optimal reports of received quality r ˆ for each given received 
quality r.  In this case, the seller will be not able to deduce received quality r exactly from 
reported quality r ˆ.  As before, the seller’s ex ante expected return from a high value 
market sale, Ew
v(q), will be less than the first best expected return Ep(q) because the first 
best does not involve an inspection cost and because, under the consignment contract, the 
buyer always underreports quality.    Under Assumption 1a (see Figure 3), there will 
generally exist a critical quality q
v > q*.  All commodities of quality q ‡ q
v will be sold 
under the consignment contract in the high value market, while all commodities of 
quality q < q
v will be sold in the alternative market.  Under Assumption 1b (see Figure 4), 
two possibilities arise.  If the difference between Ep(q) and Ew
v(q) is sufficiently small 
(that is, less than p(q) – l(q)), then the equilibrium allocation under the consignment 
contract will be the same as the first best allocation.  If the difference Ep(q)-Ew
v(q) > 
p(q) – l(q), however, there will exist a critical quality q
v as in the case of Assumption 
1a. 
These results can be summarized as follows:   17 
Proposition 3:  With ex post verification, the equilibrium allocation of the highest quality 
commodities will equal that under the first best.  Under Assumption 1a, 
the equilibrium allocation of the lowest quality will also equal the first 
best, while some intermediate quality commodities will remain 
misallocated.  Under Assumption 1b, the lowest quality commodities will 
be misallocated if Ep(q)-Ew
v(q) > p(q) – l(q); otherwise, the 
equilibrium allocation will equal the first best for all commodities. 
 
In contrast to the separating equilibrium case, inspections will occur in equilibrium.  
Thus, commercial inspection services may be economically viable in pooling equilibria 
even though they are not in separating equilibria. 
 
IV.  Equilibrium Under FOB Contracts with Certification of Shipped Quality 
An alternative to verifying received quality ex post is for sellers to have shipped 
quality certified, at a cost, by an independent inspector.  Certification makes enforceable 
FOB contracts in which the price the seller receives from high value market buyers is 
based on shipped quality.  Contracts of this type have been investigated by Viscusi, De 
and Nabar, Mason and Sterbenz, and others. 
  The high value market is perfectly competitive and high value market prices are 
common knowledge.  As a result, buyers will offer to purchase commodities at prices 
equal to their expected value on receipt.  The equilibrium FOB contract price of certified 
commodities will thus equal the expected high value market price conditional on shipped 
quality q, i.e., 
w
c(q) = Ep(q) = ￿
q
q dz q z h z p ) ; ( ) ( . 
Uncertified commodities will receive the average high value market price of all 
uncertified qualities shipped to the high value market,   18 
w
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where q
n and q
c are, respectively, the lowest and highest qualities shipped uncertified to 
the high value market. 
  Assume that the cost of certification is not prohibitive, specifically, that 
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These assumptions imply that sellers with the highest possible quality commodities will 
find selling in the high value market with certification more profitable than either selling 
without certification in a lemons market equilibrium or selling in the alternative market. 
  It will be useful to define two critical quality levels.  First, since the expected 
price with certification has a lower intercept and higher slope than the uncertified price 
curve 
Ep
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(the latter because p(q)h(q;q) > ￿
q
q dz q g q z h z p ) ( ) ; ( ) (  for all q), there exists a q*** such 
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q dzds s g s z h z p  (alternatively, Ep(q***)-a = 
Ep
u(q***)).  Second, there exists a q** such that Ep(q**) – a = l(q**).  The fact that 
Ep(q) is increasing in q implies that q** > q*, where q* is the critical quality level that 
prevails in the first best. 
  Several types of equilibria are possible.   19 
  Under Assumption 1a, commodities of the lowest quality will be sold in the 
alternative market since, by assumption, l(q) > Ep
u(q) = Ep(q) > Ep(q)-a.  If q** < 
q***, then l(q) > (<) Ep(q) for all q < (>) q** and l(q) > Ep
u(q) for all q (Figure 5a).  
Thus, all commodities of quality q ‡ q** will be sold certified in the high value market 
while all commodities of quality q < q** will be sold in the alternative market.  Sellers 
will find it optimal to certify all commodities shipped to the high value market.  
Commodities of intermediate qualities (q* < q < q**) will remain misallocated; the cost 
of certification prevents achievement of a first best allocation of quality. 
  If q*** < q**, l(q) > Ep
u(q) > Ep(q) for all q ˛ [q,q***), so that all commodities 
of qualities q £ q < q*** will be sold in the alternative market (Figure 5b).  At q***, 
￿ ￿
* * *




q dzds s g s z h z p  > Ep(q***), so that q
n = q*** and q
c is defined by 
￿
c q
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* * * * * * ) ( ) ; ( ) ( . 
If q
c < q , commodities of intermediate quality (q*** £ q < q
c) will be sold uncertified in 
the high value market while commodities of the highest quality will be sold certified in 
the high value market.  If q
c > q , all commodities sold in the high value market will be 
uncertified. 
  Under Assumption 1b, commodities of the lowest quality will be sold uncertified 
in the high value market since, by assumption, l(q) < Ep
u(q) = Ep(q) > Ep(q)-a.  If q** 
< q*** (or if l(q) < Ep(q) for all q), then Ep
u(q) > l(q) and Ep
u(q) > Ep(q) for q ˛ 
[q,q***), so that all commodities of qualities q £ q < q*** while Ep(q) > l(q) and Ep(q) 
> Ep
u(q) for all q > q*** (Figure 6a).  In this case, all commodities will be sold in the   20 
high value market.  Those of qualities lower than q*** will be sold uncertified while 
those of qualities q*** and higher will be sold certified. 
  If q*** < q**, Ep
u(q) > l(q) > Ep(q) for all q < q
n such that Ep
u(q
n) = l(q
n).  Thus, 
all commodities of qualities q £ q < q
n will be sold uncertified in the high value market 
(Figure 6b).  Further, l(q) > Ep
u(q) > Ep(q) for all q ˛ [q
n,q**), so that all commodities of 
qualities q





q dzds s g s z h z p ) ( ) ; ( ) (  for all q > q**, so that commodities of the highest qualities 
will be sold certified in the high value market. 
  Note that in any equilibrium in which some commodities are sold uncertified in 
the high value market, some sellers will earn rent.  Specifically, sellers with the lowest 
qualities of commodity sold uncertified in the high value market will receive a price 
greater than the social value of their commodities.  Thus, in contrast to equilibria with ex 
post verification, in which high value market buyers earned rent, equilibria with ex ante 
certification may permit some sellers to earn rent. 
  These results can be summarized as follows: 
Proposition 4:  If the cost of certification is not prohibitive, ex ante certification will 
replicate the first best allocation of commodities of the lowest and highest 
qualities.  Commodities of intermediate quality may remain misallocated. 
 
Proposition 5:  Ex ante certification may allow some sellers to earn rent. 
 
V.  Discussion 
This paper has investigated the ways in which costly independent third party 
verification can be used to address misallocation of product quality due to adverse 
selection problems when quality deteriorates in an exogenous stochastic manner between   21 
shipment and receipt of a commodity.  Agricultural commodities provide the classic 
examples.  Fruits and vegetables that appear in perfect condition at the time of shipment 
may rot or become moldy while in transit to distant markets.  Shipments of grain may 
become contaminated with insects that hatch from eggs that were not apparent at 
shipping time.  Contract enforcement problems of this kind appear to have been a major 
impetus for the establishment of both ex post receiving market and ex ante shipping point 
inspection services under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
Discussions of fruit marketing from the early years of the 20
th century indicate that 
widespread disputes over quality between growers and wholesalers in urban markets 
motivated growers to exert political pressure for the creation of an independent inspection 
agency (Dimitri).  The agency created in response to this pressure, operated by the 
Department of Agriculture but financed primarily by growers, has provided both kinds of 
inspections since the World War I years. 
Similar problems can occur with nonagricultural goods as well.  For example, the 
percentages of valid addresses or phone numbers on specialized mailing or telephone lists 
may be less than advertised because of changes in residence unmonitored by the list 
seller.  As a result, the user of the list may experience a larger than anticipated incidence 
of wasted mailings or calls.  Those employing the services of lobbyists offering contacts 
with key government officials may similarly find that, due to unmonitored turnover in 
employment, the personal contacts of the lobbyist hired will be fewer and less valuable 
than previously supposed.   Similarly, goods may suffer random breakage or other forms 
of damage during shipment, for example, during marine transit in unexpectedly heavy 
seas.    22 
We examine two forms of verification, ex post inspection verifying received 
quality and ex ante certification of shipped quality, in competitive markets in which 
sellers and buyers are risk neutral and in which sellers bear the cost of verification.  We 
show that both can rectify the misallocation of quality occurring in lemons market 
equilibria, at least in part.  Because verification is costly, some misallocation of quality 
may persist, however.  Furthermore, because verification is costly, some agents may be 
able to appropriate rent.  We also show that the two differ in interesting ways.  First, we 
show that in equilibrium the two are used on different qualities of commodities.  Ex post 
verification is used to verify buyers’ reports of low quality, while ex ante certification is 
used to verify sellers’ shipments of high quality.  Thus, for example, producers of 
agricultural goods will find it optimal to verify reports that low quality was received but 
will certify shipments of high quality.  Similarly, lobbyists will find it optimal to verify 
reports that low level staffers have changed jobs but will certify the current positions of 
highly influential political figures.  
Second, we show that the distribution of rent differs significantly between the two 
methods of verification.  Ex post inspection allows buyers to pay less than the social 
value of commodities they receive, on average.  In some circumstances, ex ante 
certification allows sellers of uncertified commodities to receive a price exceeding the 
social value of the commodities they ship.  As a result, one would expect buyers to prefer 






















Figure 2. First-Best and No-Verification Equilibria Under Assumption 1b 














Figure 3: Comparison of First Best, Separating, and Pooling Equilibrium 
















Figure 4: Comparison of First Best, Separating, and Pooling Equilibrium 
























Figure 5b.  Comparison of First Best and FOB with Certification Equilibria Under 









Figure 6a.  Comparison of First Best and FOB Contract with Certification 












Figure 6b.  Comparison of First Best and FOB Contract with Certification 
Equilibrium Under Assumption 1b.   27 
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